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what a r iot   
You say you want a revolution, well, you 
know, we all wanna change the world. 
—John Lennon & Paul McCartney
For a few weeks this past January and February, Egypt was the center of the world as hundreds of thousands 
of young, mostly educated, and (most im-
portant for wining attention and accolades 
in the West) tech-savvy Egyptians came to-
gether to peacefully demand their country 
back. After less than three weeks of these ex-
traordinary and inspiring protests, President 
Hosni Mubarak resigned, turning the coun-
try over to interim military leadership. Since 
similar demonstrations had brought down 
Tunisia’s autocratic leader, Zine El Abidine 
Ben Ali, only a few weeks earlier, and since 
the unrest quickly spread to Bahrain, Yemen, 
Libya and elsewhere in the region, including 
even Iran, it became common in the West 
to group these phenomena as a new Arab 
Awakening, or a region-spanning democrat-
ic revolution. Such perceptions were greatly 
aided by powerful images from Egypt, for 
example, of peaceful demonstrators being 
attacked by government-supported thugs, of 
ordinary Egyptians demanding their rights 
and freedoms, even of Christian Egyptians 
forming a human chain to protect their 
Muslim countrymen at prayer. They have 
been aided, as well, by the media and the 
cadences of political opportunism. A Time 
magazine headline shortly after Mubarak’s 
resignation, for instance, proclaimed “Iran, 
Egypt Caught in the Churning of a Mideast 
Democracy Wave” (Tony Karon, February 
15, 2011). On the eve of Mubarak’s resigna-
tion, President Obama proclaimed, “We are 
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Western media coverage of the Arab Spring has 
carried more than a hint of irrational exuberance. 
Largely forgotten in all this has been the historical 
experience of the Color Revolutions, whose initial 
high hopes yielded less-than-encouraging outcomes.
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witnessing history unfold.” In short, there is 
now a widespread view in the West, a view 
almost unanimously held in the less cynical 
United States, that we have witnessed some-
thing very special in Egypt that will lead 
to lasting and significant political change 
throughout the Middle East.
These developments, however, are not 
unanimously viewed in a positive light. 
Some in the West see the rioting crowds on 
the streets of Cairo as a harbinger of a take-
over by the Muslim Brotherhood, an Arabic 
translation of a Persian script that played out 
in Iran circa 1978–79. Conservatives have 
most frequently expressed this view, not least 
among them (albeit most irrationally) Glenn 
Beck, who said that what will happen in 
Egypt after Mubarak “will be very similar to 
what happened in Iran.” Several conservative 
politicians, such as former U.S. Senator and 
potential presidential candidate Rick San-
torum, have warned that elections in Egypt 
will lead to “sharia law.” A few profess not 
to know which way the wind will blow but 
take the democracy and Islamist poles as 
their guideposts. Thus, Roger Cohen assert-
ed, “The core issue in Egypt can be boiled 
down to this: are we witnessing Tehran 1979 
or Berlin 1989?”1
This sort of thing may make for an attrac-
tive op-ed, but Cohen’s analysis is way off the 
mark. Neither of these analogies is right for 
Egypt. We should not, however, be surprised 
by such foul-ball punditry in a media climate 
that rewards untutored opinionators for mak-
ing flash judgments. Nobody has wanted to 
offer airtime, bandwidth or column inches 
for somebody to say that the events in Egypt, 
while extraordinary, might presage a less than 
extraordinary outcome.
It’s a shame, because ordinary is precisely 
the most likely outcome in Egypt and in most 
of the countries in the Middle East that are 
now seething with popular revolt. History, re-
cent and otherwise, bears witness to the fact 
1Cohen, “Tehran 1979 or Berlin 1989?” New York 
Times, February 7, 2011.
Anti-government protestors celebrate inside Tahrir Square after the announcement of  










24 The AmericAn inTeresT
what a riot
that revolutions don’t occur simply because 
thousands of people come out to the streets, 
and that, even when revolutions do occur, they 
rarely lead to democracy. Consider the track 
record of the so-called Color Revolutions of 
the past decade, a record the media has some-
how managed to forget altogether amid its ec-
stasies over the new Arab Awakening.
It was only between five and eight years ago that demonstrations similar to those that 
have occurred in Egypt swept parts of the for-
mer Soviet Union. At the time, many thou-
sands of peaceful demonstrators clogged the 
streets of Tbilisi, Kyiv and Bishkek to demand 
change and democratic reform in Georgia, 
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. The West saw these 
Color Revolutions, as they came to be known, 
as undeniable heralds of liberal democracy. 
That’s not how things turned out—at least 
not in any simple way in Ukraine, probably 
not even in the long run in Georgia, and not 
even a little bit in Kyrgyzstan. The excitement 
of January 2004 in Georgia and February 
2005 in Ukraine seems almost quaint today, 
as both of those countries have fallen consid-
erably short of their democratic promise. In 
Kyrgyzstan, where a corrupt authoritarian re-
gime was ousted peacefully in 2005, a regime 
at least as corrupt and authoritarian replaced 
it. And the march of Color Revolutions came 
to an abrupt halt in 2006. 
The three Color Revolutions show us 
three possible ways that seeming Middle 
Eastern democratic breakthroughs can fizzle 
out in only a few years. In Ukraine, after 
Viktor Yuschenko became President follow-
ing attempts by his opponent Viktor Yanu-
kovich to steal the election in 2004, many 
had expectations similar to those for Egypt 
today. Yuschenko was publicly committed to 
reform and democracy, as well as to the mod-
ernization of the Ukrainian economy, but his 
efforts were largely unsuccessful throughout 
his six-year presidency. Political opposition 
to his government as well as dissension with-
in it remained strong throughout his term, 
weakening Yuschenko politically and mak-
ing it hard for him and his allies to pass their 
ambitious reform proposals. And when the 
Ukrainian economy began to suffer following 
the global economic crisis of summer 2008, 
Yuschenko’s popularity plummeted further. 
Ukrainian voters soundly rejected him at the 
polls in 2010, giving him less than 6 percent 
of the vote. In the runoff, Yuschenko’s erst-
while Orange Revolution ally, Yulia Timo-
schenko, lost to the same Viktor Yanukovich 
whose attempts to steal the 2004 election led 
to the Orange Revolution in the first place. 
Since coming into office, Yanukovich has 
sought to reverse much of the liberalization 
of Ukrainian society that had begun dur-
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make what he is doing anti-democratic, for 
it appears to be reasonably popular and little 
if any of it violates the constitution, but it 
certainly does make Ukraine a very differ-
ent place from what liberal Western publics 
expected it to become back in 2004.
In Kyrgyzstan, the story has been much 
simpler. The regime that came to power fol-
lowing the 2005 Tulip Revolution turned out 
to be as least as authoritarian and corrupt as 
the regime it had replaced. Led by President 
Kurambek Bakiev, it made little effort to con-
ceal its corrupt nature and lasted only five 
years. Now, ironically, hope resides in the new 
regime that ousted the Tulip Revolution re-
gime. It may yet make Kyrgyzstan more dem-
ocratic, but this, like much else in the country, 
remains to be seen.
Georgia’s failure to live up to Western ex-
pectations regarding democracy followed yet 
another path. In Georgia, unlike in Kyrgyz-
stan, the new government was significantly 
less corrupt than its predecessor and evinced 
a genuine commitment to economic reform. 
It wasn’t too long, however, before democracy 
dropped away from the government’s true pri-
orities. Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili 
has built a strongman regime that, while far 
from being a dictatorship, bears little resem-
blance to democracy. There is limited politi-
cal competition, almost complete dominance 
by one political party, and de facto restrictions 
of press freedoms and the judicial and legisla-
tive branches of government. No institution in 
Georgian society can claim much genuine in-
dependence from the powerful executive. 
What It All Doesn’t Mean
Thus by 2010, five years after the last of the post-Soviet Color Revolutions, the demo-
cratic potential so widely touted just a few years 
before had dissipated in all three countries. 
What can we conclude from the desultory his-
tory of the once-vaunted Color Revolutions? 
The main lesson seems to be that ousting 
a non-democratic leader, once his time is up, 
is surprisingly easy but is not in itself particu-
larly important for democratic development. 
Given the size of Egypt and the length and 
brutality of his rule, Mubarak, like Eduard 
Shevardnadze in Georgia and Askar Akaev 
in Kyrgyzstan, left office relatively quickly 
and peacefully. (Libya, Bahrain and other 
Middle Eastern countries, of course, have fol-
lowed different paths in 2011, but that only 
shows, once again, the limits of all analogies.) 
Building democracy is a far more difficult 
and chancy prospect even after a corrupt or 
authoritarian leader resigns. As P.J. O’Rourke 
once memorably put it, “It is one thing to 
burn down the shithouse, another to install 
plumbing.”
Another major lesson of the Color Revolu-
tion is that continuity, even after an apparent 
regime change, is a very powerful political force. 
Mubarak is gone, but the Egyptian army and 
its vast patronage network are not, suggesting 
that a year from now the country may look a lot 
less different than those celebrating democracy 
there would like to think.
Those seeking to understand or craft policy 
toward post-Mubarak Egypt should keep these 
two lessons in mind. There are enormous po-
litical spaces between Islamic theocracy, liberal 
democracy and authoritarian rule by a military 
strongman. Egypt will almost certainly end up 
somewhere in between those ideal type descrip-
tions. The regime will probably be a unique 
hybrid of democracy and authoritarianism—
in other words, a mixed regime with Egyptian 
characteristics. It will have secular and religious 
features and structures, and it will almost cer-
tainly retain a strong role for the military bu-
reaucracy, if only because, as things stand now, 
there are simply no other cadres in the country 
capable of running it.
This means that newspaper headlines, state-
ments by politicians and inspirational images 
from January and February 2011 notwithstand-
ing, we should be cautious about referring to the 
events in Egypt as a revolution. Using this term 
any time large groups of people come to the 
streets and oust their leaders dumbs down the 
meaning of the word and confuses it with terms 
like coup, ouster or secession—all of which may 
prove to be more useful ways to understand 
what has just happened in Egypt. Recall that 
the Color Revolutions also appeared to be revo-
lutions as they were happening; the crowds of 
people shivering in the Kiev or Tbilisi winters 
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were just as inspiring as 
the images we have seen 
from Egypt. But as time 
has passed, it is clear 
that “revolution” is a 
very generous interpre-
tation of what happened 
in Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan 
and Georgia.
Just as the history 
of dominant-party sys-
tems in Georgia con-
tributed to the devel-
opment of yet another 
one-party system after 
that country’s Rose 
Revolution, or just as 
the kleptocratic behav-
ior of the Akaev regime 
in Kyrgyzstan was 
quickly adapted by the 
new regime following 
that country’s Tulip 
Revolution, so, too, is 
it likely that powerful 
institutional actors in 
Egypt, most likely the 
military, will continue 
to assert significant 
influence on the coun-
try’s future. It is also 
likely that the Muslim 
Brotherhood, whose 
strength is not as great 
as many conservative 
observers think, will 
play a role. The expe-
rience of the Color Revolutions suggests that 
strong democratic institutions, rule of law, 
and press and civic freedoms will not come 
easily to Egypt, not just, or necessarily, be-
cause Egypt has unique “Muslim country” 
problems, but because these things have not 
come easily anywhere in recent years. Indeed, 
they did not come easy to Britain, France or 
America, if one stands far enough back in time 
to take a candid look. Even if they do emerge, 
democratic institutions in the new Egypt will 
be as incomplete, fragile and flawed as they 
are in much of the post-1989 post-authoritar-
ian world.
Perhaps the best analogies for Egypt in this regard are two other Arab cases of regime 
change: Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution, now all 
but collapsed, and the imposed revolution in 
Iraq. Lebanon’s promise has been broken by 
U.S. timidity and inattention, Lebanon’s own 
demons, and an aggressive proxy strategy via 
Hizballah from Iran, aided by Syria. Lebanon 
is one of the few Arab countries that had real 
political parties, real political institutions, a 
cosmopolitan culture and a vibrant press and 
intellectual life. Its prospects for democratic de-
velopment were relatively good, yet the demo-
cratic opening seems to have failed. As for Iraq, 
The last time protesters ousted an Arab autocrat:  
November 4, 1964, Khartoum, Sudan.
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the drama is far from over. If in a year’s time 
Egypt’s political culture looks like Iraq’s today, 
we would probably judge that as a positive out-
come. But while the U.S. government exerted 
too little post-revolutionary pressure in Leba-
non, it obviously exerted a great deal, if not too 
much, in Iraq. (Clearly, this is not an option in 
Egypt.) The lesson here is not that democracy is 
impossible in the Arab world; it isn’t. It is that 
the road to democracy can be an extremely dif-
ficult one for societies with no experience of it, 
as recent history in the former Soviet Union also 
demonstrates.
That points directly to another reason that 
we should bear only temperate expectations for 
Egypt’s future. The regimes overthrown during 
the past decade in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyr-
gyzstan were far less authoritarian and repressive 
than Mubarak’s, and in all three Color Revo-
lutions the opposition was associated with the 
West. The United States, in particular, was seen 
as having played an outsized and positive role in 
those events. In Egypt, on the other hand, the 
United States is seen, accurately enough, as the 
patron of the authoritarian regime just brought 
to its knees. The magnitude of U.S. assistance to 
Egypt and the willingness of the United States 
to turn a blind eye to its human rights violations 
during the Mubarak era are not lost on the dem-
onstrators in Egypt, or elsewhere in the region. 
What this means is that America will have less 
influence as both aid and as model in post-up-
heaval Egypt than it had in Georgia, Ukraine or 
even Kyrgystan. On the other hand, given the 
extent to which U.S. policy ended up facilitating 
the movement away from democracy in Kyrgyz-
stan and Georgia, this may end up proving help-
ful to Egypt’s democratic aspirations.
U.S. friendliness with Mubarak’s Egypt also 
means that the Obama Administration should 
be very careful not to get out in front in press-
ing U.S. democracy assistance aid. It may not be 
welcome, and the mere fact of its being offered 
publicly may enable those who do not have the 
interests of democracy at heart to exploit it for 
their own ends. We would be wise to provide help 
only if the new Egyptian authorities or Egyptian 
democracy activists explicitly request it.
Egypt’s post-Mubarak government will not 
have been entirely immune to U.S. influence, 
however. Washington retains significant clout 
with the Egyptian military through what can 
be fairly called the power of the purse and 
through personal relationships with numerous 
Egyptian military leaders. But that influence 
must be deployed discreetly if it is not to back-
fire. If the United States comes to be seen to be 
the partner and protector of a new military gov-
ernment that is perceived as moving too slowly 
or not at all toward a more decent and open 
political system, then U.S. influence in Egypt 
in the long term will gravely suffer. Given the 
poor reputation of the American connection, it 
could also damage the high regard with which 
many Egyptians still hold their military.
The Wages of Clientalism
Although the Obama Administration didn’t create the U.S. policy toward Egypt in place 
during the last days of the Mubarak era, the 
policy unraveled on Obama’s watch, thus pre-
senting his Administration with a difficult test. 
Faced with a long-time client who was rapidly 
becoming too costly to keep, the United States 
received yet another reminder of the perils of cli-
entalism. Those perils describe a pattern: The 
longer the client relationship persists, the more 
U.S. influence declines. Most clients can never 
fully be controlled even when they are insecure 
and needy, but when their political survival is 
threatened they have even fewer inducements to 
follow the advice of their patron, as demonstrat-
ed by Mubarak’s infamous final two telephone 
calls with President Obama.
This resembled the progression of events in 
Georgia. As that country inched closer to war 
in 2008, its government ignored a counsel of 
caution from Washington, thinking that its 
close personal ties were strong enough to be the 
Georgian tail that wagged the American dog. 
Clientalism, of course, is understood to serve 
the interests of stability, and it can—for a while. 
What we often forget, however, is that stability 
is a good thing if it blocks change for the worse, 
but not so good if it blocks change for the better. 
When the negative seems far more likely than 
the positive, as is often the case in the Middle 
East, patrons are tempted to entertain the illu-
sion that the client is more stable than he really 
is, and that the patron is uniquely qualified to 
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guarantee stability. This can give rise to a very 
dangerous dynamic in which the client claims 
that only he can prevent the deluge (which he 
skillfully exaggerates) and in which the patron 
believes him, because he just might be right. The 
patron thus ends up with a policy whose increas-
ing inflexibility is matched only by its decreasing 
influence over the client. 
The U.S.-Georgia relationship before 2008 
provides the perfect example of this process of 
policy ossification. What American leaders said 
back then about President Saakashvili, who 
was a less authoritarian U.S. client back then, 
resonates with what some American leaders said 
about Mubarak only a short time ago. Clearly, 
Mubarak’s status as a long-time American client 
contributed to the statements of friendship and 
support from an Administration that initially 
seemed to be having trouble appreciating the 
scope and direction of events in Egypt. This ex-
plains Vice President Joseph Biden’s January 27 
refusal to refer to Mubarak as a dictator, as well 
as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s February 
5 remark to the Munich Security Conference: 
“He [Mubarak] has given a clear message to his 
government to lead and support this process of 
transition.” This latter was a remark so absurd 
on its face that Secretary Clinton appeared in 
the eyes of sentient Egyptians to be either a liar 
or a fool. Indeed, it easily beats anything said 
publicly by a Bush Administration official on 
the cusp of the Georgia-Russia War.
As accident-prone as the process of letting 
go was for the Administration, what comes 
next may be even more treacherous. The cava-
lier nature with which Administration officials 
at the highest levels have spoken about Egypt’s 
transition to democracy raises the concern that 
it does not yet really understand either Egyp-
tian politics or the potential American role in 
making Egypt more democratic. Comments 
like President Obama’s remark that “nothing 
less than genuine democracy will carry the 
day” are essentially platitudes reflecting the 
political needs of the moment, but they could 
morph into catastrophe if they are a reflection 
of what he really believes the United States 
can accomplish. Given President Obama’s ad-
mission that he wanted his rhetoric to be out 
in front of his private analysis of the risks in-
volved in the Egyptian maelstrom, there is a 
good chance they aren’t a sign of what he really 
thinks. Whatever flaws we may have noticed 
in the Obama foreign policy thus far, the dis-
ease of ideological thinking is not among them. 
That is as good a reason as any to think that, in 
contrast to the Color Revolutions, we may get 
it right this time. 
